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The separation of ownership and management, as a major characteristic of 
contemporary firms, could improve operational management efficiency enormously, 
but also brings forth the agency problem. The objective inconsistency as well as 
information asymmetry of the principal-agent may reduce the agency efficiency 
sharply .The equity-based incentive link managerial salary and welfare with firm 
value closely so as to convergent the interest between managers and shareholders. 
However, because of the existence of information asymmetry, managers as rational 
economic individual may adopt aggressive accounting policy and carry out the 
earnings management, which would violate the original purpose of equity-based 
incentive. As a significant clue of detecting earnings management, the financial 
restatement play a big revealing role in research of whether the managers who are 
granted equity-based incentive have manipulated the information. 
Since 2006, China has implemented the "Securities Act", "Company Law", 
"Equity Incentive Measures for the Administration of Listed Companies" and other 
laws and regulations, which provides a legal basis and protection for the application 
of equity-based incentives. The application of the domestic equity incentive is 
increasing year by year. The design, grant and the implementation of incentive stock 
options are closely related with the quality of information disclosure and its incentive 
effects depend on the support of the real and reliable financial information. However, 
various types of financial restatements, "Annual Report of the patch," flood the view 
of investors, which leads the people to doubt the quality of financial information 
disclosure. To ensure the health of the domestic equity incentives, and orderly 
development, it is necessary to study the intrinsic link between the equity incentives 
and the financial restatement. 
This paper uses the domestic listed companies in 2006-2009 as the sample 
applying  the single factor analysis and multiple regression analysis, from the 
holding of the shares and the equity incentive plan perspectives in order to study the 
relationship between the equity incentives of the listed companies in China and 
financial restatement. The results show that the listed company which proposes the 
equity incentive programs are more likely to make the financial restatements, 














executives be of the opportunity tendency and more motivated to take aggressive 
accounting policies or make financial fraud; Hereinto, the stock options and the 
possibility of financial restatements are related, but there is no evidence that the 
implementation of restricted stock is more likely to lead to financial restatements; The 
higher the ratio of the equity value to pay in the management of the listed companies 
are ,the less likely financial restatements happen, indicating after the managers weigh 
the interests of the earnings management and the decreased equity value due to the 
financial restatement, they are more unlikely to choose to financial restatements. 
Paper is divided into six chapters, each chapter is as follows:  
The first chapter is an introduction, describing the research background as well as 
significance and defining the concept and scope of the study and illustrating the main 
ideas and innovation; 
Chapter two firstly from the principle-agent, information asymmetry and the 
efficient market theory perspectives, introduces the financial restatements and the 
theoretical basis of equity incentive, then reviews and clears up the relevant literature 
at home and abroad. 
Chapter three puts forwards the assumption of the study, from the equity incentive 
plans, different modes of the equity incentive plans and the management shareholding 
making the assumption of the relationship with the financial restatements, meanwhile, 
as for the special nation conditions and the impact our enterprises and the proportion 
of state-owned shares have upon the restatement ,making the assumptions about the 
impact of the financial restatement; 
The fourth chapter is the design of the research ,makes the assumptions as the 
starting point, defining variables and design model, and introduce the study sample 
selection and screening process; 
Chapter Five is the empirical results and discussion, as the main part of this paper, 
from the descriptive statistics, single variable analysis, multivariate regression 
analysis and robustness testing respectively, discussing the relations between the 
executives’ equity incentives and financial restatements in China's listed companies  
Chapter six is the conclusion and outlook summing up this article and putting 
forward the limitations of this study and future research directions. 
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1997 年的 0.9%飙升到 2005 年 9 月的 6.8%；国内各种形式的财务重述也日渐增
多，2001 年至 2007 年 A 股市场年有 613 家上市公司进行了财务重述，占截止




                                                        






























































2006 年 1 月 1 日全国人大修订后的《证券法》、《公司法》开始施行。尤其是《公
司法》第一百四十三条“回购股票”的规定，以及第一百四十二条“高管层转让
所持公司股份”的规定，为股权激励的股票来源提供了基本的法律依据。证监会
也在 2006 年 1 月 5 日适时推出《上市公司股权激励管理办法》（试行）。同时，
税收、会计等政策和法规的修订为也使股权激励更具操作性。所以，本文将研究
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